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Even in these days of the women’s liberation movement, theassumption of marital homogeneity of political values is
rarely challenged. Wives may be more involved in politics than
ever before, and there are a few outstanding examples of
families in which the wife is clearly politically dominant. Even
so, the assumption is retained that husbands and wives rarely
differ politically (Miller, 1970).
Yet, in fact, there is very little direct evidence to support or
deny couple homogeneity at the mass level.’ What evidence
does exist consists of questionable inferences from aggregate
data showing few sex differences in political attitudes and of
data showing that husbands and wives typically support the
same political party.
Our first task, then, is to provide some evidence of the scope
and depth of spouse agreement about political affairs. More
than this, however, we also want to delve into the more difficult
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matter of explaining variations in levels of agreement. We are
well aware of the hazards of approaching this question without
panel data covering the pre- to postmarital period. Insofar as
possible, however, we will seek to determine whether selection,
mutual socialization, or something else accounts for the
similarity which is found.
STUDY DESIGN
The data were gathered in 1965 as part of a larger study of
political socialization among high school seniors. The core of
the study was a national probability sample of 1669 seniors.
One-third of the seniors were randomly designated for mother-
only interviews, one-third for father-only interviews, and
one-third for both mother and father. It is the latter group of
husbands and wives that we make use of here. Due largely to
the anticipated loss from one-parent families, interviews were
completed with 430 husband-wife pairs (with a weighted N of
531).
The sample can be treated as a representative cross-section of
couples having high school seniors. It should be noted that the
sample has some class bias (compared to the population of all
parental couples) since high school dropouts were not included
in the student sample, and an age bias since most of the couples
are between the ages of 35-55.
COUPLE HOMOGENEITY
Our data permit an assessment of homogeneity in four
different political areas: trust and cosmopolitanism, partisan-
ship and voting, attitudes on specific issues, and evaluations of
sociopolitical groups. For comparison, several nonpolitical
orientations will also be considered. Briefly, political trust is a
five-item Guttman scale (CR = .93) based on questions dealing
with the conduct of the national government.’ Cosmo-
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politanism is a scale which ranks respondents in terms of their
interest and attention to different levels of government, ranging
from extreme localist to internationalist. Party identification is
based on the standard Michigan questions yielding seven
categories from strong Democrat to strong Republican. Issue
questions were either of the agree-disagree type or &dquo;forced-
choice&dquo; questions where respondents were given two opposing
points of view and asked which one was closest to their own
point of view. Group evaluations are &dquo;thermometer&dquo; items,
where respondents rated each of eight groups on a scale ranging
from zero to 100. Of the nonpolitical items, social trust is a
three-item Guttman scale (CR = .94), the religious Funda-
mentalism question asks for an interpretation of the Bible
ranging from &dquo;God’s Word&dquo; to &dquo;irrelevant,&dquo; and the final
question asks whether teenagers are better, worse, or about the
same as they used to be.
In the left-hand column of Table I we provide percentages of
husbands and wives who show perfect agreement on each of the
items mentioned above.3 (The correlations in Table 1 will be
referred to later.) For a number of the items perfect agreement
is a rather stringent requirement because the measures divide
respondents rather finely. Therefore, in a footnote to the table,
we provide the percentage of pairs showing near-perfect
agreement on these items. For all items except partisanship, the
&dquo;near-perfect&dquo; agreement figure represents perfect agreement or
disagreement of no more than one category. The party
identification figure represents perfect agreement using only the
three-way division into Democrats, independents, and Republi-
cans.
Interpretation of these figures is complicated by several
considerations. The first such consideration concerns the
possible lack of respondent interest in specific issues. The
percentages in Table I are based on all pairs in which both the
husband and wife expressed an opinion. But we know that in
some cases individuals have little or no interest in a given issue.
If we include these people in our calculations (adding to the
amount of agreement only when both the husband and wife
136]
TABLE 1
Similarity of Husbands’ and Wives’
Political Orientations
a. &dquo;Near-perfect&dquo; agreement, as defined in the text, is as follows: political trust, 60%;
cosmopolitanism, 57%; party identification, 76%; group evaluations (in order), 699~0,
71, 53, 57, 51, 55, 50, 52.
b. Numbers of cases on which the percentage is based.
disclaim interest), we would expect lower rates of agreement
than those so far observed. Two of the issue questions allow us
to make such a calculation. Each of these questions was
prefaced by asking respondents whether they had enough
interest in the issue to have an opinion. Including in the
pcrcentagc agreement those who said, &dquo;no, they did not have an
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opinion&dquo; lowers agreement on the school integration issue to
56% and on the school prayer issue to 71 %.
A second consideration which must be attached to the figures
in Table 1 is the extent of extreme disagreement. A good
illustration is the case of partisanship. Whereas Table 1 indicates
that over half of the husbands and wives disagree at least
marginally and a fourth disagree even in the three-way
classification, one finds that only 7% of the families include
both a Republican and Democratic spouse. The remainder
includes various combinations of partisans and independents.
Similarly, even though the question on school integration and
school prayers did not allow an intermediate category, a
number of people took this option by answering &dquo;it depends.&dquo;
Diametrically opposed views are taken only by 18% and 11 % on
the integration and prayer issues, respectively. The same point
could be made about each of the other orientations. Extreme
disagreement between spouses is much less rare than some
minimal sort of disagreement.
Bearing all of these factors in mind, the figures in Table 1
indicate to us that the assumption of couple homogeneity is
indeed quite well founded. Even when the measures are finely
calibrated, a quarter or more of the couples agree exactly. When
a reasonable tolerance for minor discrepancies is allowed, at
least three-fifths of the husband-wife pairs show agreement in
their expressed viewpoints.’ And of the remainder, far fewer of
the husbands and wives show extreme disagreement when some
&dquo;moderate&dquo; attitude is permitted. Moreover, the similarity of
political attitudes compares quite favorably with agreement
about nonpolitical orientations.
At the same time, the degree of unanimity among husbands
and wives should by no means be exaggerated. Only in voting
behavior and religious affiliation was agreement extraordinarily
high. This suggests to us an important conclusion. There exists
within families a previously unrecognized potential for changes
of attitudes and behavior. Were husbands and wives in more
complete accord in their thinking, the mutual support they
provide each other would make it more difficult for either of
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them to change their viewpoints. Given some disagreement,
however, an opening wedge already exists for attitudinal and
behavioral change. Of course, many of the disagreements are
only moderate, and, as we noted, some arise simply because of
indifference on the part of one spouse. But to describe a
situation in which most husbands and wives have at least
minimally divergent viewpoints on any given issue, and in which
up to two-fifths have more than minimal disagreements, is to
suggest a family political structure less monolithic than that
traditionally portrayed.
Moreover, it is clear that if we look across issues we find
disagreement about some issue(s) among nearly all couples. A
simple way of observing this is to create an index which is the
percentage of items on which couples agree. Using the ten
political topics in Table 1, excluding group evaluations, each
couple is given a score ranging from zero, representing no
agreement, through 100, representing agreement on every issue.
The distribution of husband-wife pairs on this index is given in
Figure 1. Many families show more than an occasional
Figure 1: Distribution of Husband-Wife Pairs According to Amount of Agreement
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disagreement. In fact, some 32% of the families show minimal
or greater disagreement on more than half of the orientations.
An additional 13% of the pairs disagree on exactly half of the
orientations.
This figure, then, confirms the conclusion drawn on the basis
of the separate items. Husbands and wives are characterized to a
large extent by similarity of political orientations. But their
similarity is not so complete that it prevents spouses from being
a potentially dynamic component in the development and
maintenance of political attitudes.
DETERMINANTS OF HOMOGENEITY
EXPECTED AGREEMENT
Much of the agreement found among husband-wife pairs may
be attributable to the general agreement among males and
females. As a test of this possibility, correlations were calcu-
lated between husbands’ and wives’ opinions. Even if actual
agreement is very high, the correlations will be zero if the
amount of agreement is no higher than what would be expected
by chance. In addition, the correlation that we will use is
relatively unaffected by the number of response categories, a
useful consideration when the number of responses varies as it
does here.
The correlations between husbands’ and wives’ attitudes are
presented in the right-hand column of Table 1. The distinc-
tiveness of voting behavior stands out clearly, even apart from
partisanship. Husbands and wives vote much more similarly
than one would expect if their behavior were statistically
independent. Husbands’ and wives’ partisan feelings, while less
associated than their votes, also show considerably more
similarity than independence would suggest. On the specific
issues the highest correlations are for the most concrete,
immediate issues of integration and school prayers. The more
removed and abstract issues of communists holding office and
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of free speech, and even the 18-year old vote, which was not an
immediate concern in 1965, show considerably reduced correla-
tions. Political trust and cosmopolitanism are also characterized
by modest correlations. S
Overall these correlations indicate that husbands and wives
are certainly more similar than one would expect if their views
were statistically independent. For contrast one might compare
the figures representing student-parent agreement. In every case
the husband-wife correlation is higher, usually by .1 to .2
(Jennings and Niemi, 1974: 155). Yet they also indicate that
when expected agreement is considered, husbands’ and wives’
attitudes are far from completely coterminous with their
spouses’ viewpoints.
Thus, while considering determinants of couple homogeneity,
we must keep in mind that a good deal of the observed
similarity can be attributed to what would be expected by
chance. Our strategy will be to look for characteristics which
are related to the correlations between husbands’ and wives’
attitudes-that is, to the degree to which husbands and wives
agree more than is randomly expected-and not simply to the
level of agreement per se.
SELECTION OR MUTUAL SOCIALIZATION °
Obviously a panel design would be most appropriate for
distinguishing between these contrasting explanations for pa-
rental homogeneity. Suitable panels are so rare, however, that we
must approach the matter in as adequate a manner as possible
with cross-sectional studies. Within these design limits, several
measures provide what seems to be a good way of distinguishing
between the two explanations. On the one hand, suppose the
similarity between spouses were due primarily to selection
effects. If we control for relevant background characteristics,
we should find that husbands and wives are more similar when
their backgrounds are more alike. Theoretically, the most
relevant background factors are those which are related to the
attitudes or behavior in question and which, conceivably at
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least, are widely used in determining marriage partners. In
contrast, suppose the explanation for husband-wife homo-
geneity was mutual socialization. Since mutual influence is
dependent upon interaction and exchange, frequent discussions
of political topics would lead to increased homogeneity.
Curiously, the results do not strongly support either of these
explanations, though they are consistent with the selection
hypothesis in regard to party identification and the mutual
socialization model for those who discuss politics very fre-
quently. Considering selection effects first, we related the
background factors of education, region, social class when
growing up, size of town or city in which one grew up, religion,
and partisan background (the husbands’ and wives’ fathers’
party identification) to similarity of current attitudes. In each
case, except that of education, we selectively sought effects
where they were most likely to occur.&dquo; Since education is
related to so many political orientations, we looked for
potential effects of this factor on all of the orientations given in
Table 1.
Although there were isolated instances in which couples from
dissimilar backgrounds had less similar attitudes, there was only
one instance in which a consistent, explicable effect was
observed. 7 When their fathers had identical loyalties, the
correlations between spouses’ identifications were .59 and .61
for those of Democratic and Republican backgrounds, respec-
tively. (There was only one case in which both fathers were
independent.) But when the fathers differed, including partisan-
independent mixes, the husband-wife correlation dropped to
.44. When both fathers had the same party loyalties, the
correlations between the husbands’ and wives’ votes were .80
and .91 for Democratic and Republican fathers, respectively.
When the fathers differed, the correlation dropped to .75. Thus
the similarity of party badkgrounds does seem to affect the
homogeneity of marriage partners’ partisanship and voting.’
But this selection effect does not apparently extend to other
political orientations or other background characteristics.
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Though the data examined thus far do not support the
selection hypothesis, we should search more deeply for possible
selection effects. In many cases where we categorized couples as
coming from different backgrounds, the degree of difference
was minimal-for example, a college graduate married to
someone with only a partial college education. It might be the
case that if we narrowed our view to couples differing
substantially in background that we would observe a consistent
drop in political agreement.
Educational background, social class, and partisanship were
used to test this because they are monotonically related to a
number of political orientations (so that individuals from very
different backgrounds are more likely to have very different
political views) and because there are enough couples with
reasonably large background differences. We used a six-step
education classification and an eight-step occupational classifi-
cation for the husbands’ and wives’ fathers. In each case we
took husbands and wives whose background differed by at least
two levels and compared their degree of similarity with that of
homogeneous couples. For partisanship, extreme mixes were
those in which the father of one spouse was a Democrat and the
other a Republican. Even in these more extreme cases, however,
similarity of political views was related to homogeneity of
background only in the instance of partisanship-where the
correlations between husbands’ and wives’ party identification
and vote dropped slightly below those noted for the mixed case
earlier. Thus, even relatively gross dissimilarities in backgrounds
failed to result in consistently lower husband-wife agreement.
Now let us turn to the frequency of husband-wife discussions
of political affairs and see whether there is evidence to support
the mutual socialization model. We will use the frequency of
political discussions as reported by both spouses.’ The data
(not shown) consist of a set of five correlations, one for each
frequency of discussions, for each of the attitudes (excluding
group evaluations) listed in Table 1. If mutual socialization were
the explanation for the level of husband-wife similarity, we
would expect the correlations to decline along with the
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frequency of political discussions. While something like this
pattern is observed in one or two cases, there is no common
pattern to the variations in correlations. Similarly, no common
pattern emerges from a comparison of husband and wife
attitudes when spouses report getting along with each other
very well, pretty well, or not very well. Contrary to what the
mutual socialization model would suggest, there is no gain in
the similarity as husbands and wives get along better.’ 0
As in the case of background characteristics, let us push the
matter of political discussions to an extreme. Specifically, let us
divide husband-wife pairs into a small group (10% of the
sample) in which both husband and wife report very frequent
political conversations, and a small group (10%) at the other
extreme in which both spouses allege that they &dquo;never&dquo; discuss
politics and public affairs, with the remaining 80% constituting
a heterogeneous middle group. Do we now find a pattern of
higher agreement where discussions are frequent and lower
agreement where they are rare?
The results (Table 2) suggest that very frequent conversations
do to some extent raise agreement levels between husbands’ and
wives’ attitudes. If we compare the frequent talkers with the
large middle group or with the entire set of husbands and wives
(Table 1), we find higher correlations in virtually every instance.
Moreover, the absolute levels of the correlations are rather high
for this group, especially on the more concrete issues. On the
other hand, those who profess very few political conversations
are not correspondingly lower in their agreement levels. Indeed,
in three cases they are more similar than the very frequent
talkers!
There is, then, a degree of positive support for the mutual
socialization model. At one extreme we do find husbands and
wives who are considerably more alike than chance would
predict and who exceed expected levels of agreement by
substantially more than the rest of the population. But we must
remember that this conclusion applies to only a tenth of the
couples; for the remainder the mutual socialization model seems
no more appropriate than the selection hypothesis.
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TABLE 2
Similarity of Husbands’ and Wives’ Political Attitudes
Controlling for Frequency of Political Discussions
a. Very high: both husband and wife report having discussions of public affairs and 
’
politics &dquo;very often.&dquo; Very low: both report that they &dquo;don’t talk&dquo; about public
affairs and politics. High to low: all other husband-wife pairs.
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS
If neither selection nor mutual socialization adequately
explains the observed similarity of husbands and wives (above
and beyond what would be expected by chance), how might
this homogeneity be explained? One possibility is simply that
the everyday similarities experienced by couples serve to
heighten their political homogeneity even in the absence of any
mutual influence. Husbands and wives, more than a randomly
chosen pair, read the same newspapers, see the same television
programs, listen to the same friends, and in general share the
same experiences. To the extent that these factors influence a
person’s attitudes, spouses could be expected to grow more
similar as time passed.
It is also possible that selection and mutual socialization are
appropriate explanations, but that they do not operate in the
manner described above. Selection, for example, may occur on
the basis of attitudinal agreement rather than similarity of
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background characteristics. We doubt that selection of spouses
is based on explicitly political attitudes, but similarity of broad
social viewpoints would probably be sufficient to guarantee at
least a moderate degree of concordance on specific political
issues. Mutual socialization could also operate differently than
as described above, occurring primarily in the early years of
marriage.1 1 Since most of the couples in our sample had been
married at least 17 years, there would be little or no residual
impact to observe at this point. Alternatively, mutual socializa-
tion may occur slowly but steadily even in the absence of many
political conversations. Thus, after 17 years there could
reasonably be mutual accord even among spouses who rarely
discuss politics.
To probe these various explanations would require a different
study design than that employed here. Until that is done we will
not adequately be able to distinguish among them. Nonetheless,
our analysis has cast doubt on selection effects, except for the
domains of partisanship and voting, and has suggested that
mutual socialization later in marriage affects at most a small
portion of the population. It also indicates that much of the
agreement between husbands and wives is artifactual; it would
exist even in the absence of mutual selection or influence.
CONCLUSION
Gross generalizations about couple homogeneity based on the
similarity of voting behavior need to be qualified substantially.
At the same time, there is no gainsaying the presence of
widespread agreement, especially if the requirements of exact
agreement are relaxed. These relatively high rates of agreement
(as distinct from the pair correlations) have two important
implications. At the level of husband-wife pairs it means that
one partner ordinarily can look to the other for support and
reinforcement or-at the very least-not be in direct conflict
with that partner. To the extent that stability and consonance
are desired attributes, the agreement levels provide a personally
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satisfying environment. More significantly, these levels of
agreement reduce the likelihood of change by either partner
since there is a supportive, reinforcing environment at hand.
. What should not be lost sight of, however, is that appreciable
disagreement does exist across a variety of political attitudes. It
is a rare couple that agrees on everything. The presence of
nonsupportive environments would seem likely to produce the
kinds of results often observed when primary group support is
weak, namely, less consistent behavioral and attitudinal states.
The second implication of couple similarity lies in its role as a
determinative factor in the successful transmission of political
values from parents to children (Jennings and Niemi, 1974: ch.
6). If husbands and wives disagreed more frequently than we
observed, we would expect an even weaker flow of political
attitudes between generations than has been found. What we
have been observing, therefore, is an important variable in
understanding the process of political socialization. At the time
of our data collection the rate of husband-wife agreement
results in a picture of parental life devoid of much conflict over,
or even much exchange of political ideas. But this need not
always be so. And to the extent that this agreement is variable
in other circumstances, we would look for concomitant
variation in the transmission of parental values to the next
generation.
NOTES
1. Politics is clearly not a major source of marital conflict. But this may be due
to agreement between spouses or to the low salience of politics in comparison with
more immediate concerns such as money and children. See Blood and Wolfe (1960).
2. Question wording is found in Jennings and Niemi (1974).
3. For percentage purposes, the thermometer ratings are always divided into the
ten groups scored 0-9, 10-19, ..., 90-99.
4. The lower agreement rates on group evaluations may well be a function of
measurement problems. See Niemi (1974: ch. 7).
5. The order of the correlations for group evaluations is very much dependent
on the variance of the ratings for each group. Thus, for example, while husbands and
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wives agree that whites and Protestants rate highly (see Table 1), the variance in the
ratings is so low that their responses show little correlation.
6. Region was considered with reference to items dealing with race and religion;
social class with attitudes toward labor unions and big business, cosmopolitanism,
and the "communist hold office" and "speeches against churches" issues; size of
town with cosmopolitanism; religion with the school prayer and "speeches against
churches" issues; partisan background with partisanship and voting.
7. In contrast to our results here, the educational background of husbands
versus wives does have a considerable effect on political resources, interest, and
participation. See Jennings and Niemi (1971).
8. A much more extensive investigation of this case is found in Beck and
Jennings (1975).
9. There is a fair amount of disagreement between husbands and wives about
the frequency of political conversations. Here we have combined the two reports into
a simple index, though some analysis was performed, with the same results, using
each spouse’s responses separately. As another way of overcoming possible response
unreliability, we will look at extreme cases below.
10. We put less eight on these latter results because of the greater possibility of
response unreliabilities (Niemi, 1974: chs. 5 and 8).
11. However, studies of nonpolitical attitudes have found little relationship
between length of marriage and husband-wife similarity (Kirkpatrick and Hobard,
1954; Kelly, 1961; Udry, Nelson, and Nelson, 1961).
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